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INTRODUCTION
A corporation’s communications with counsel may be protected by
the attorney-client privilege. 1 This privilege belongs to the corporate
entity alone. 2 The executives who communicate acquire no personal
privilege. 3
Consequently, if a corporation waives its privilege, its executives’
Not only may those
communications become discoverable. 4
communications, thereafter, be used as evidence against the corporation,
but they may also be asserted against the executive who made them. 5 In
a criminal investigation, for example, the corporation can strike a deal
with prosecutors conditioned on full government access to corporate
records, with a corresponding waiver of privilege. 6 Subsequently, the
executives who communicated, whether they understood the limits of
corporate privilege confidentiality or not, might find that their
statements formed the basis of criminal charges brought against them, as
individuals. 7
Executives thus face a dilemma. If they avoid cooperating with
corporate counsel, they risk adverse job consequences. On the other
1. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see generally JOHN
GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE (3d ed. 2000) (Supp. 2007).
2. E.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978)
(en banc) (“Ordinarily, the privilege belongs to the corporation and an employee cannot
himself claim the attorney-client privilege and prevent disclosure of communications
between himself and the corporation’s counsel if the corporation has waived the
privilege.” (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich. 1977)));
see generally GERGACZ, supra note 1, at §§ 2.04-.09.
3. See Diversified Indus., Inc., 572 F.2d at 611 n.5.
4. See United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333, 335 (4th Cir. 2005); see generally
GERGACZ, supra note 1, at § 2.09.
5. See Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 465-66 (denying defendant-employee’s motion for
relief from an alleged violation of attorney-client privilege, which defendant claimed
existed by virtue of the attorney’s representation of her employer).
6. See United States v. Stein, No. S1 05 CRIM 0888, 2006 WL 1063295, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2006) (mem.).
7. Cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1034
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (“The corporation has waived its privilege and since a corporation can
act only through its officers, Vesco cannot assert the attorney-client privilege as to
matters involving the affairs of the ICC, or embracing his role or activities as an ICC
officer or director.”).
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hand, providing unreserved, frank, veracious information could leave
them vulnerable if the corporation later waives its privilege. What are
they to do? The law of attorney-corporate client privilege does not
provide an adequate answer. This Article will suggest one.
At the outset the current law concerning executive-corporate
counsel relationships will be examined. Although a personal attorneyclient privilege can arise for the executive, the conditions apply only in
atypical situations. 8 In most cases, the executive’s dilemma remains.
Thus, a change in the law is warranted: one that provides protection
for communicating executives while respecting the boundaries of the
attorney-corporate client privilege. To that end, a proposal will be
offered. This proposal will neither provide a separate communicating
executive privilege nor will it ease the dual representation standards.
Instead, this Article advocates limiting the scope of corporate privilege
waiver. This limit recognizes the particular nature of corporate client
privilege and the complex relationship that exists between executives
and their corporate employers.
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW: ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege keeps certain otherwise relevant
information from being disclosed. Its origins have been traced to
Roman law and, within the common law, to Elizabethan England. 9 It
has always been a part of American law. 10 Under the privilege,
confidential communications between attorney and client are not
8. See Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 465 (acknowledging that, in very limited
circumstances, communications implicating personal liability for acts within the scope
of an individual’s employment may be protected by individual attorney-client privilege,
but only upon a showing that the individual’s communications implicated her interests
alone and were segregable from those involving the employer’s interests).
9. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2290 (McNaughton rev.,
1961); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the AttorneyClient Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1978); Max Radin, The Privilege of
Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487 (1928).
10. See United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915).
The desirability of protecting confidential communications between attorney and
client as a matter of public policy is too well known and has been too often recognized
by textbooks and courts to need extended comment now. If such communications
were required to be made the subject of examination and publication, such enactment
would be a practical prohibition upon professional advice and assistance.

Id.; see also Hatton v. Robinson, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 416 (1833); Crosby v. Berger, 11
Paige Ch. 377 (N.Y. Ch. 1844).
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discoverable. 11 Thus, an adversary must build a case without access to
the privileged information source.
Not every discussion involving an attorney and another person,
however, qualifies as privileged. The often-cited United States v. United
Shoe Machinery case sets forth a number of factors that distinguish
privileged communications from non-privileged. 12 These factors can be
arranged around three elements. First, the communicators must be an
attorney and a client. The attorney must be acting as a lawyer 13 and the
client must be seeking legal advice. 14 Failure to establish either attorney
or client status will disqualify the communications from attaining the
privilege. 15 For example, not all individuals who communicate with an
attorney are considered clients. A waiter taking a lunch order is not a
client, nor is a bank teller who receives a deposit. Even a witness,

11. See Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 490 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The attorney-client
privilege protects communications made in confidence by a client to his attorney in the
attorney’s professional capacity for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.”).
12. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950).
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to be
come [sic] a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a
member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which
the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for
the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a
crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client.

Id.
13. See, e.g., Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mut. Reinsurance Bureau, 150 F.R.D.
193, 197 (D. Kan. 1993).
In sum, the court is satisfied that Great Plains’ attorney was acting in his capacity as
an attorney during the relevant portions of the board meetings. The advice rendered
by Great Plains’ attorney required the skill and expertise of an attorney. In addition, it
appears clear from the minutes of the board meetings that the purpose of the
conversations during the board meetings was to render legal advice, and that both
Great Plains and its attorney understood that the purpose of the communications was
to review and consider legal issues pertaining to Great Plains’ litigation with MRB.

Id.
14.
15.

See Jenkins, 487 F.3d at 490.
See, e.g., In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“[T]he professional relationship for purposes of the privilege for attorney-client
communications ‘hinges upon the client’s belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that
capacity and his manifested intention to seek professional legal advice.’” (quoting
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1390 (7th Cir. 1978))).

2008

PROTECTING EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS

39

interviewed by counsel, falls outside the client requirement. Witnesses
merely provide information. They do not do so in order to receive legal
advice. 16 Similarly, not every lawyer, when communicating, does so in
a law-related role. A law professor might be licensed to practice in a
given jurisdiction, but she communicates as a teacher while lecturing in
the classroom. Further, no privilege arises when a lawyer works as an
accountant. 17 This lawyer would be communicating as a business
adviser, not as a legal one.
The second United Shoe Machinery element focuses on the purpose
of the information exchange. 18 To qualify as privileged, attorney-client
communications must further the provision of legal advice. 19
Communications conducted for other reasons fail to satisfy this
element. 20 For example, discussions of business strategy, divorced from
legal implications, would not qualify as privileged. 21
Further,
conversing about the attorney’s fees also falls outside the legal advice
privilege requirement. 22 Both illustrations pertain to information
concerning business or financial matters rather than the law.

16. See, e.g., Leer v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. Ry., 308 N.W.2d 305, 309
(Minn. 1981).
17. United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that no
privilege arises when lawyer acts as an accountant); see also In re Spring Ford Indus.,
Inc No. 02-15015DWS, 2004 WL 1291223, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. May 20, 2004)
(finding that no privilege arises when lawyer acts as a language translator); GERGACZ,
supra note 1, at §§ 3.22-.36.
18. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358.
19. See, e.g., Status Time Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 95 F.R.D. 27, 29-31
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“If documents containing considerable technical factual information
are nonetheless primarily concerned with asking for or granting legal advice, as
opposed to giving business or technical advice, they are privileged.”); see also
GERGACZ, supra note 1, at §§ 3.43-.47.
20. See, e.g., Foseco Int’l Ltd. v. Fireline, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 22, 24 (N.D. Ohio
1982) (“Communications made in the routine course of business, however, such as
transmittal letters or acknowledgment of receipt letters, which disclose no privileged
matters and which are devoid of legal advice or requests for such advice are not
protected.” (citing Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44 (N.D. Cal. 1971)));
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1975).
21. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 732 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2d
Cir. 1984) (recognizing that it is well established that attorney-client communications
related to areas other than legal counseling, such as business advice, are not privileged).
22. See, e.g., In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 793 F.2d 69, 71 (2d
Cir. 1986); see also GERGACZ, supra note 1, at § 3.50.
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United Shoe Machinery’s third privilege element is
confidentiality. 23 Privilege confidentiality has two parts: First, the
communications must occur privately; 24 Second, they must remain
confidential thereafter. 25 For example, attorney-client discussions that
take place in a crowded restaurant do not satisfy the initial
confidentiality component.
Others could readily overhear their
conversations. As for the second component, clients who reveal to
others communications they have with their lawyers forfeit any privilege
that may otherwise have applied. 26 Attorney-client privilege does not
safeguard private communications that clients later reveal.
The law has long-embraced an attorney-client privilege because it
is considered essential for the effective operation of the adversary
system. 27 Law is complex and guidance is needed to make decisions
based on its precepts. Attorneys provide this guidance. To do so

23.
24.

United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358.
See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Dep’t of Conservation and Natural Res., 859 So. 2d
1096, 1103 (Ala. 2002) (“Whether a party intended the communication to be
confidential is dependent on who was privy to the legal advice.”); GERGACZ, supra note
1, at §§ 3.50-.66.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 776 F.2d 965, 971 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding
that to determine whether a particular communication is confidential and protected by
the attorney-client privilege, the privilege holder must prove the communication was
“(1) intended to remain confidential and (2) under the circumstances was reasonably
expected and understood to be confidential”); United States v. Naegele, 468 F. Supp. 2d
165, 170 (D.D.C. 2007) (stating that communications from the client which reveal
information that was not meant to remain confidential are not protected by the attorneyclient privilege).
26. See, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 463
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“It is hornbook law that the voluntary disclosure or consent to the
disclosure of a communication, otherwise subject to a claim of privilege, effectively
waives the privilege.”); GERGACZ, supra note 1, at §§ 5.01-.64.
27. See Hatton v. Robinson, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 416, 422 (1833).
This principle we take to be this; that so numerous and complex are the laws by which
the rights and duties of citizens are governed, so important is it that they should be
permitted to avail themselves of the superior skill and learning of those who are
sanctioned by the law as its ministers and expounders, both in ascertaining their rights
in the country, and maintaining them most safely in the courts, without publishing
those facts, which they have a right to keep secret, but which must be disclosed to a
legal adviser, and advocate, to enable him successfully to perform the duties of his
office, that the law has considered it the wisest policy to encourage and sanction this
confidence, by requiring that on such facts the mouth of the attorney shall for ever be
sealed.

Id.
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adequately, counsel must be informed about the matters. Otherwise, the
quality of legal advice will suffer.
Often, the client has the best information. 28 To encourage the client
to be forthcoming, a special relationship with counsel, based on trust and
candor, must exist. The privilege fosters this relationship by cloaking
attorney-client communications with confidentiality. Without this
protection, clients would face the daunting prospect that what was
candidly disclosed to counsel could later be discovered by their
adversaries. Clients would soon learn that communicating with counsel
was a two-edged sword, on the one hand promoting sound legal advice,
but on the other, creating a treasure trove of discoverable evidence.
Consequently, clients would be tempted to hold back when
communicating with counsel. Thus to promote client candor, the law
protects privileged communications from disclosure.
II. CORPORATIONS AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Corporations may have privileged communications with counsel. 29
The privilege belongs to the entity alone. 30 The individuals who
communicate on its behalf do not acquire any personal privilege. 31

28. See Crosby v. Berger, 11 Paige Ch. 377, 377 (N.Y. Ch. 1844).
The object of the rule, protecting privileged communications from being disclosed by
the attorney or counsel, is to secure to parties who have confided the facts of their
cases to their professional advisors, as such, the benefit of secrecy in relation to such
communications; so that the client may disclose the whole of his case to his
professional adviser, without any danger that the facts thus communicated to his
attorney or counsel will be used in evidence against him, without his own consent.

Id.
29.
30.

See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
E.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978)
(“Ordinarily, the privilege belongs to the corporation and an employee cannot himself
claim the attorney-client privilege and prevent disclosure of communications between
himself and the corporation’s counsel if the corporation has waived the privilege.”
(citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich. 1977))); see also
GERGACZ, supra note 1, at §§ 2.05-.10.
31. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued to Powers (In re Powers), No. 94-56603,
1995 WL 608481 (9th Cir. Oct. 11, 1995) (“An employee of a corporation that holds an
attorney-client privilege may not assert the corporation’s privilege for personal
protection where there is no express agreement for personal representation or where the
employee has not requested such representation.” (citing United States v. Layton, 855
F.2d 1388, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988))); In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d
333 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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Further, only the corporate entity may waive or assert its privilege. 32
Although this can only be done by a corporation’s management, the
power is not specific to any individual. It is attached to the
organizational function. Thus, if an individual moves between positions
or leaves the company altogether, the power to exercise the
corporation’s privilege does not follow; the power remains with the
corporation’s management, now occupied by someone else. 33
Consequently, the attorney-client privilege for corporate clients and
for individual clients differ somewhat. For corporations, certain features
of the privilege are split among the holder (the corporation), the one who
communicates with counsel (e.g., an executive) and the one with power
to assert or waive the protection (management). 34 For individuals, all
three components are joined together; the individual, who communicates
with counsel, is protected by the privilege and has the power to assert or
waive it. 35
The client’s candor, which the privilege is deemed to induce, also
differs when the client is a corporation. For corporate clients, the
confidentiality that the privilege promises as an incentive does not
pertain to the executives who communicate on its behalf. The
executive’s communication remains confidential only if the corporation
asserts its privilege. 36 Confidentiality for the executive is a by-product
32. CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1986) (“As an inanimate entity, a
corporation must act through agents. A corporation cannot speak directly to its lawyers.
Similarly, it cannot directly waive the privilege when disclosure is in its best interest.
Each of these actions must necessarily be undertaken by individuals empowered to act
on behalf of the corporation.”).
33. Id. at 349 (“Displaced managers may not assert the privilege over the wishes of
current managers, even as to statements that the former might have made to counsel
concerning matters within the scope of their corporate duties.”); see GERGACZ, supra
note 1, at § 2.36.
34. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348 (“[T]he power to waive the corporate attorneyclient privilege rests with the corporation’s management and is normally exercised by
its officers and directors.”).
35. See, e.g., Newman v. State, 863 A.2d 321, 334 (Md. 2004) (“[O]nly the client
has [the] power to waive the attorney-client privilege.”).
36. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1034
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (“The corporation has waived its privilege and since a corporation can
act only through its officers, Vesco cannot assert the attorney-client privilege as to
matters involving the affairs of the ICC, or embracing his role or activities as an ICC
officer or director.”); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 469 F.3d 24 (1st Cir.
2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2005); Stein, 463
F. Supp. 2d 459; United States v. Stein, No. S1 05 CRIM 0888, 2006 WL 1063295, at
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of this decision. The executive has no personal control over his
statements.
This does not mean that there are no incentives for candid
communication. 37 The incentives, instead, are organizational, focusing
on how corporations process information. The corporate privilege
encourages management to generate policies that give counsel access to
a full range of information. An expansive information-flow policy
enables counsel to provide sound legal advice, thereby advancing the
interests of justice. A privilege for corporate clients furthers this end.
Consider the alternative, where no corporate privilege exists.
Internal information, directed to counsel, could create a storehouse that
adversaries could readily access. Although the corporation would still
need legal advice, this need might be tempered by the risk that later
disclosure could entail. Consequently, management might be deterred
from providing the same level of information flow that exists under the
corporate privilege. Nonetheless, corporate privilege excludes the
executive who communicates from its protection. If the communicator
cooperates with corporate counsel, he risks disclosure if the corporation
waives its privilege. If the communicator evades, he risks adverse job
consequences. 38
Under some circumstances, the law provides a personal attorneyclient privilege for corporate executives. 39 When that happens, the
executive’s communications with counsel remain confidential until the
executive decides to reveal them. The executive’s communications are
thus uncoupled from those of the corporation. Although such a scenario
can occur, it is not the usual outcome. 40
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2006) (mem.).
37. See GERGACZ, supra note 1, at §§ 1.19-.21, 3.58.
38. See Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 461 (recognizing dilemma facing individuals who
communicate on corporate employer’s behalf).
39. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648, 650 (E.D. Mich.
1977).
If the communicating officer seeks legal advice himself and consults a lawyer about
his problems, he may have a privilege. If he makes it clear when he is consulting the
company lawyer that he personally is consulting the lawyer and the lawyer sees fit to
accept and give communication knowing the possible conflicts that could arise, he
may have a privilege.

Id., aff’d per curiam, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978).
40. See e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 571 (1st Cir. 2001) (“The
default assumption is that the attorney only represents the corporate entity, not the
individuals within the corporate sphere, and it is the individuals’ burden to dispel that
presumption.” (citing United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc.,
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III. COMMUNICATING EXECUTIVES AND A PERSONAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
An executive who communicates about corporate matters can create
a personal attorney-client privilege in two ways: First, by retaining a
separate personal attorney; 41 Second, by entering into an attorney-client
relationship with corporate counsel. 42 In this latter setting, corporate
counsel will represent two clients—the executive and the corporation.
In addition, under either backdrop, the communications must occur so
the executive can obtain legal advice for himself. No personal privilege
will arise if the communications merely further the corporation receiving
legal advice. 43
A. Retaining a Personal Attorney
An executive who hires an attorney for personal representation will
have his communications with that attorney protected by the privilege,
even if the subject of those communications concerned corporate
matters. 44 Basic tenets of the attorney-client privilege readily apply.45
Counsel’s client is solely the executive. Legal advice is provided to the
executive rather than to the corporate employer. Communications with
the executive further that end. Merely because the executive was an
employee and business activities were the communication’s subject does
not change this conclusion.
Consider Ex Parte Smith. 46 In that case, outside directors of Just
For Feet, Inc. retained separate counsel to advise them, personally, about

874 F.2d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1989))).
41. Ex parte Smith, 942 So. 2d 356 (Ala. 2006).
42. See, e.g., In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120
(3d Cir. 1986); Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 462-64.
43. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d at 573 (finding that no personal
privilege arose because “the individuals’ allegedly protected communications with the
[l]awyer did not appear to be distinguishable from discussions between the same parties
in their capacities as corporate officers and corporate counsel, respectively, about
matters of corporate concern”).
44. See Ex parte Smith, 942 So. 2d at 359-60.
45. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950) (listing elements needed to establish attorney-client privilege).
46. 942 So. 2d 356.
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corporate matters. 47 The attorney was not retained to provide advice to
the corporation nor was there any relationship between the attorney and
Just For Feet, Inc. Just For Feet, Inc. paid the attorney’s fee, however,
and the board, as a whole, did not object to the arrangement. 48
The discovery dispute arose while Just For Feet, Inc. was in
bankruptcy. The corporation’s trustee in bankruptcy sought access to
the outside directors’ communications with their retained counsel. 49 The
trustee argued that no personal privilege attached because the subject of
those communications concerned corporate matters. 50 That being the
case, the trustee contended only a corporate privilege could apply, and
the bankruptcy trustee controlled it. 51 The trial court agreed and ordered
discovery. 52
The Alabama Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus and
directed the lower court to vacate its discovery order. 53 The court found
that an attorney-client relationship existed between the outside directors
and their retained counsel, and that Just For Feet, Inc. was not
represented by that attorney. 54 Further, quoting with approval from In re
Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., the court focused on the
purpose of the communications at issue, rather than on the topics they
covered. 55 Although Bevill was based on somewhat different facts (the
officers sought a personal privilege for communications with corporate
counsel), 56 the Alabama Supreme Court found its logic persuasive. 57
The court noted that communicating in order to obtain personal
legal advice about corporate matters could create a personal privilege. 58
Communicating about the same topics, so the corporation could obtain
legal advice, would not. 59 The reason for the executive’s communication
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 357-58.
Id.
Id. at 358-59.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 360 (quoting from In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp.,
805 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1986).
56. In re Bevill, 805 F.2d 120.
57. Ex parte Smith, 942 So. 2d at 360.
58. Id. at 360-61.
59. See id. at 360 (referencing Grand Jury Proceedings v. United States, 156 F.3d
1038, 1041 (10th Cir. 1998)).
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was the key, rather than the subject matter. 60 In Ex Parte Smith, the
directors sought personal legal advice from their attorney.61
Consequently, a personal privilege attached, irrespective of who paid the
attorney’s fees. 62
Ex Parte Smith illustrates a straightforward means for executives to
have privileged communications when discussing corporate matters.
However, this tactic might not deliver much practical benefit. The only
communications that are protected are those with a personal attorney.
Discussing company matters with corporate counsel would not be
affected. These latter discussions occur most often and Ex Parte Smith
would not apply to protect them.
Further, the attorney-client privilege only covers the specific
communications, not the information expressed therein. 63
The
discovering party may acquire the same information from any nonprivileged source. 64 Thus, if the discovering party can obtain the
executive’s communications under a waived corporate privilege, little
solace would be provided if similar ones about the same topic had also
been conducted with the executive’s personal attorney. The cat would
be out of the bag. Verily, although Ex Parte Smith provides some
protection for communicating executives, for the most part, the dilemma
remains.
If the corporation waived its privilege, candidly
communicating with the corporation’s attorney still risks disclosure.
B. Create a Personal Attorney-Client Relationship with the
Corporation’s Counsel
Determining whether communications between the executive and
corporate counsel are personally privileged is an arduous task. It
requires that the executive becomes a client of his corporate employer’s
attorney, and that his communications occurred while seeking personal
legal advice rather than advice for the corporation. Ordinarily, when an

60.
61.
62.
63.

See id.
See Ex parte Smith, 942 So. 2d 356.
See id. at 360.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981); see GERGACZ, supra
note 1, at § 3.51.
64. Ex parte Smith, 942 So. 2d at 360 (“[The officers] must show that the substance
of their conversations with [counsel] did not concern matters within the company or the
general affairs of the company.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Bevill, Bresler, &
Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir.1986))).
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executive communicates with corporate counsel, no personal privilege
attaches. 65 Corporate counsel only represents the corporation. The
corporation conveys information to its attorneys through the
communication of its executives. The executive is not seeking personal
legal advice as information is provided as part of the executive’s
corporate role. Instead, while communicating, the executive personifies
his corporate employer and does not act for himself. Thus, no personal
attorney-client representation exists. 66
Upjohn v. United States, the leading corporate privilege case,
referred to the executive’s role as one factor in characterizing privileged
corporate communications. 67 Under Upjohn, the employee must
communicate within the scope of his job. 68 Doing so makes the
communication a corporate one. For example, an employee-accountant
who communicates about balance sheet entries does so as the
corporation. That same employee, while interviewed about witnessing
an accident involving a corporate van, communicates as an individual
because observing accidents is not within the accountant’s corporate
role. 69 Thus, no privilege would attach. 70
If this corporate accountant wanted personal protection for the
balance sheet entry communications, however, he must look beyond
Upjohn and its corporate organization focus. To create a personal
privilege, the accountant must first establish an attorney-client

65. E.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978)
(“Ordinarily the privilege belongs to the corporation and an employee cannot himself
claim the attorney-client privilege and prevent disclosure of communications between
himself and the corporation’s counsel if the corporation has waived the privilege.”); see
also GERGACZ, supra note 1, at §§ 2.04-.09.
66. In re Powers, No. 94-56603, 1995 WL 608481 at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 11, 1995)
(“An employee of a corporation that holds an attorney-client privilege may not assert
the corporation’s privilege for personal protection where there is no express agreement
for personal representation or where the employee has not requested such
representation.”); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 415 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
67. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395; see also GERGACZ, supra note 1, at §§ 3.72-.81
(discussing Upjohn’s corporate client privilege doctrine).
68. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395; see also GERGACZ, supra note 1, at §§ 3.03-.78, 3.90.
69. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383.
70. Leer v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. Ry., 308 N.W.2d at 309 n.8 (“Upjohn
is critically different from the instant case in that the communications in Upjohn
regarded a matter within the scope of the employee’s duties. In the instant case the
witnessing of an accident was not within the scope of the employees’ duties.”).
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relationship with corporate counsel. 71 The attorney will thus have two
clients: the corporate entity and the executive. Yet, formally creating a
dual attorney-client relationship is typically not done. Counsel’s sole
client is usually the corporation and the executive merely communicates
as its employee. 72 In addition, counsel’s dual representation might yield
substantial conflict-of-interest issues. 73 Thus, counsel could be wary of
taking on the executive as an additional client. As the Fourth Circuit
noted: “Indeed, the court would be hard pressed to identify how
investigating counsel could robustly investigate and report to
management or the board of directors of a publicly-traded corporation
with the necessary candor if counsel were constrained by ethical
obligations to individual employees.” 74 This further discourages formal
dual relationships.
Nonetheless, a dual attorney-client relationship may be inferred. 75
Although expressed several ways, the test requires the executive to have
reasonable grounds to believe that he was personally represented by
corporate counsel. 76 This standard would not be satisfied from an
executive’s subjective intuition. 77 An inferred representation needs to
be based on objective evidence. This is a difficult test to meet. For
example, if corporate counsel informs the executive that the corporation
is his client, no inferred relationship will arise, even if the executive
misunderstands the effects. 78 The advisory suppresses any reasonable
belief an executive may have in a personal attorney-client relationship.

71. See, e.g., In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120,
123 (3d Cir. 1986); Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459.
72. See In re Powers, No. 94-56603, 1995 WL 608481 at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 11,
1995); In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2005); Stein, 463
F. Supp. 2d 459.
73. In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d at 340 (noting that the
corporate attorneys serving dual clients acknowledged a loyalty to America Online
(“AOL”) when they stated, “[W]e can represent you as long as no conflict appears”).
74. Id.
75. In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333.
76. See id.; Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459; see also GERGACZ, supra note 1, at § 2.11.
77. See Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1115 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (“[A]lthough the
so-called client’s subjective belief can be considered by the court, this belief is not
sufficient to establish an attorney-client relationship.”); see also Hansen v. Caffry, 720
N.Y.S.2d 258, 259 (App. Div. 2001) ( “[A] plaintiff’s unilateral beliefs and actions do
not confer upon it the status of client.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
78. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(d), cmts. 7 & 8. (noting that
such is counsel’s duty under rules of professional conduct).
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Consider In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal from the Fourth
Circuit. 79 AOL’s attorneys informed the communicating executives that
their client was the corporation only, and that any privilege belonged
solely to AOL. 80 Even though the executives were also told that the
corporation’s attorneys could provide personal representation, there was
no indication that they agreed to do so. 81 The court held that, based on
this disclosure, there was no objectively reasonable evidence that the
executives could believe they had any personal attorney-client
relationship. 82 Consequently, the executives’ motion to quash a
subpoena that sought access to their communications with AOL’s
counsel was denied. 83
Even in absence of a pre-communication disclosure, executives
would be hard-pressed to establish that their relationship with corporate
counsel was a personal one, rather than within their corporate roles. 84
Although other factors might point to a possible personal attorney-client
relationship, the difficulty is to show that these factors, at the time of the
communication, underpinned the executive’s belief that corporate
counsel was his attorney, too. 85 The mere existence of those factors
would not be sufficient to support the inference. United States v. Stein
demonstrates the sufficiency requirements. 86
KPMG counsel interviewed one of its partners, Carol Warley,
during an internal investigation of problem tax shelters. 87 No precommunication advisory was given. 88 Thus, unlike the investigation in
79.
80.

In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333.
Id. at 336 (“We represent the company. These conversations are privileged, but
the privilege belongs to the company and the company decides whether to waive it.”).
81. Id. (“We represent AOL, and can represent [you] too if there is not a conflict
. . . the attorney-client privilege is AOL’s and AOL can choose to waive it.”).
82. Id. at 339-40.
83. Id. at 341.
84. United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
85. See generally, id. at 462-63 (discussing the different standards applied by
district courts to determine when personal privilege attaches).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 461 n.11 (noting that Warley’s status as a partner in the KPMG
partnership did not change the court’s analysis of her role as an “employee”
communicating on behalf of her “employer”).
88. Id. at 460.
This problem could be avoided if counsel in these situations routinely made clear to
employees that they represent the employer alone and that the employee has no
attorney-client privilege with respect to his or her communications with employerretained counsel. Indeed, the Second Circuit advised that they do so years before the
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In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 89 there was no record that
Warley was told that counsel’s only client was KPMG and that any
privilege belonged solely to the firm. Nonetheless, Warley had the
burden of establishing the inferred relationship. 90
Warley argued that two factors supported the inferred relationship.
In past cases, company counsel jointly represented her and KPMG. 91 In
addition, a provision in KPMG’s partnership agreement stated that “[t]he
General Counsel shall act on behalf of all Members, except where a
dispute arises between an individual Member and the Firm.” 92 Even so,
this showing was not sufficient and, thus, no personal attorney-client
relationship was found. 93 The court advanced several rationales. 94 First,
KPMG’s counsel had not misrepresented that they were acting as
Warley’s personal counsel. 95 Further, Warley never requested that she
be personally represented. 96 Consequently, no justifiable inference
could have arisen from any words spoken between the parties. In
addition, the mere existence of the partnership agreement clause did not
establish a dual representation. 97 Warley needed to show that she relied
on that clause as the basis for inferring a personal attorney-client
relationship. 98 Since that connection was not made, no representation
was found. 99 As for the previous joint representations, the court
determined that Warley was a witness in those proceedings, not a coparty with KPMG. 100 She had no personal stake in those cases. 101 Thus,
no reasonable expectation could arise that all communications thereafter
occurred under a dual attorney-client relationship. 102 Since Warley

communications here in question. [original footnote omitted] But there is no evidence
that the attorneys who spoke to Ms. Warley followed that course.

Id.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2005).
Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459.
Id. at 461.
Id. (citing DeVita Decl., Ex. E, ¶ 3.6).
Id. at 466.
Id. at 464-65.
See id. at 465.
See id. at 462-63, 465.
See id. at 466.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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asserted attorney-client privilege, she had the burden of establishing all
of its elements. 103 Because she could not, her communications were
discoverable following KPMG’s waiver. 104
Even if an executive does establish a personal relationship with
corporate counsel, all communications would not automatically be
protected. Only those that occurred for the purpose of seeking personal
legal advice would qualify. 105 This requirement, too, is difficult for an
executive to satisfy. Ordinarily, as Upjohn suggests, communicating
about company matters makes the communication that of the corporate
client. 106 To overcome this, the executive must change the focus of the
communication. The focus must become a personal one rather than one
related to corporate affairs, so that the executive is not personifying the
entity when communicating with counsel. Somehow, the executive
must signal that discussing, for example, reorganizing the corporation’s
West Coast operations, is not being done on the corporation’s behalf.
Instead, the information is being provided so personal legal advice may
be obtained. The Tenth Circuit provided an illustration: “For example, a
corporate officer’s discussion with his corporation’s counsel can still be
protected by a personal, individual attorney-client privilege when the
conversation specifically concerns the officer’s personal liability for jail
time based on conduct interrelated with corporate affairs.” 107
The court in United States v. Stein examined this requirement, too,
and found that even if Warley was a client of KPMG’s counsel, no
personal attorney-client privilege would have attached. 108 Although her
communications about the tax shelters implicated both KPMG and her
individually, she would have needed to show that they occurred for a
personal purpose. 109 She could not. Questions about personal liability
did not trigger the communications. 110 Instead, her liability concerns
arose out of what she told counsel in furthering KPMG’s internal
investigation. 111 Thus, only KPMG could be protected by the privilege.

103.
104.
105.

Id. at 465.
Id. at 466.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 1998); see also
GERGACZ, supra note 1, at § 2.11.
106. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
107. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d at 1041.
108. United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 465-66.
111. See id. at 465.
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Corporate privilege law provides little protection for executives
unless they take steps to limit their exposure before even speaking with
corporate counsel. But, executives are not lawyers steeped in the
intricacies
of
attorney-client
relationships
and
privileged
communications. They are experts in business with an important role to
play when corporations seek legal advice. The following section will
propose a change in law that protects executives who are steadfast in
their duties, candidly communicate, and thus, enable corporate counsel
to acquire the information needed to provide sound legal advice.
IV. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE PRIVILEGE WAIVER TO PROTECT
EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS
A corporation’s privilege waiver should be limited by a
communicating executive’s veto right. This veto right should only arise
if the privileged information is sought to be used against the executive,
personally. The executive may then exercise the veto and exclude those
communications from evidence. Under this proposed rule, the executive
has neither personal privilege, nor a say in the corporation’s waiver
decision. A waiver will still make privileged corporate information fully
available in discovery. The discovering party may continue to use the
information against the corporation or a third party or put it to any other
use. The veto power merely narrows the range of a corporate privilege
waiver.
The veto will not protect every communicating executive, however.
It will be restricted to those who did so without receiving an advisory
beforehand. Such an advisory will notify the executive that counsel’s
client is the corporation and that it controls any privilege. Providing this
information
removes
misapprehensions
about
lawyer-client
relationships. Further, there is no personal expectation of privacy or
confidentiality. Once the advisory is given, the executive will
understand that he is merely imparting company information to
corporate counsel and that he has no control over its use.
Consider how this proposed rule would apply in In re Grand Jury
Subpoena: Under Seal 112 and then in United States v. Stein. 113 In In re
Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 114 the AOL executives received a

112.
113.
114.

415 F.3d 333, 339 (4th Cir. 2005).
463 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
415 F.3d at 339.

2008

PROTECTING EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS

53

pre-communication advisory. 115 Although the advisory was not a model
of clarity, it was, nonetheless, found to be satisfactory. 116 The advisory
identified AOL as counsel’s only client although the executives were
given an option to seek the advisory’s counsel. 117 The executives did
not subsequently exercise such an option explicitly. 118 The advisory
further alerted the executives that AOL controlled any privilege and
could choose to waive it. 119 Thus, the AOL executives knew that their
only role was to further their employer’s aims. 120 Any misapprehension
was eliminated. In addition, since the advisory noted that AOL could
later unilaterally disclose the communications, no expectation of
privacy, even a mistaken one, could reasonably occur. 121 Thus, there
was no unfairness and the proposed rule’s narrowing of the effect of the
corporate client’s waiver would not apply.
United States v. Stein, on the other hand, is exactly the type of
situation for which the proposed rule is meant to address. 122 KPMG’s
counsel did not give Warley a pre-communication advisory. 123 Nor did
it inform Warley about her position as communicator, its role as
KPMG’s counsel, or, the discretion that KPMG retained as sole holder
of the privilege. 124 Further, a teamwork ethos existed, too; exemplified
by a provision in the partnership agreement and Warley’s past
relationships with KPMG counsel. 125 Consequently, one could readily
see how she was lulled into excusable ignorance about the nature and
consequences of candidly communicating with KPMG’s counsel.
Fairness demands a different approach than the one that current law
accommodates. Under the proposed rule, Warley could block those
communications from being used as evidence against her. They could,
however, still be used as evidence against KPMG or any other party.

115.
116.

Id.
Id. at 340 (“We note, however, that our opinion should not be read as an
implicit acceptance of the watered-down ‘Upjohn warnings’ the investigating attorneys
gave the appellants.”); see GERGACZ, supra note 1, at § 2.16.
117. See id. at 339-40.
118. Id. at 339.
119. Id. at 339-40.
120. Id. at 340.
121. Id.
122. 463 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
123. Id. at 460.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 461.
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V. JUSTIFICATION FOR PROPOSED RULE
Three justifications may be offered for this Article’s proposal: First,
the rule is in accordance with how attorney-client privilege principles
have been applied to corporations; Second, the rule provides an
incentive (or, at least, removes a disincentive) for executives most
closely connected to a matter to candidly provide information to
corporate counsel; Third, the rule is consistent with other principles of
law that were created specifically to ameliorate otherwise occurring
unfair or unjust results.
A. Consistent with the Nature of a Corporation’s
Attorney-Client Privilege
The artificial corporate entity, as distinguished from an individual,
must act through others. This fact was taken into account when
privilege principles were applied to corporate clients. Consider the
following three leading corporate privilege cases. First, Upjohn Co. v.
United States molded the concept of communication to the reality of
how corporations impart information. 126 Upjohn set forth a number of
factors for identifying which employee communications with counsel
qualified as privileged corporate communications. 127 Similarly, CFTC
v. Weintraub focused on a corporation’s decision-making structure as it
analyzed the source of an entity’s control over its privilege. 128
Weintraub identified management as the place within the corporate

126.
127.

449 U.S. 383 (1981).
Id. at 394-95. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger summarizes the
factors the Court considered:
Because of the great importance of the issue, in my view the Court should make clear
now that, as a general rule, a communication is privileged at least when, as here, an
employee or former employee speaks at the direction of the management with an
attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of employment. The
attorney must be one authorized by the management to inquire into the subject and
must be seeking information to assist counsel in performing any of the following
functions: (a) evaluating whether the employee’s conduct has bound or would bind the
corporation; (b) assessing the legal consequences, if any, of that conduct; or (c)
formulating appropriate legal responses to actions that have been or may be taken by
others with regard to that conduct.

Id. at 402-03 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted).
128. 471 U.S. 343, 351 (1986).
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hierarchy where the power to waive the privilege resided. 129 Finally,
Garner v. Wolfinbarger focused on intra-corporate disputes where
shareholders sought access to corporate materials over which the
directors had asserted the corporation’s privilege. 130 Garner’s “good
cause” test sought to balance the interests of these key corporate actors
with those of the entity. 131
This Article’s proposed rule follows this model. Its modification of
the effects of a corporate privilege waiver brings to the fore the
organizational role of the employee-communicator. By doing so, the
proposed rule is built upon two of Upjohn’s factors for identifying
corporate privilege: First, that the employee must communicate within
the scope of his job; Second, that the employee must know that the
purpose of the communication is for the corporation to obtain legal
advice. 132
These factors distinguish an executive acting as an individual (when
no corporate privilege arises) from one who personifies the entity. In
the latter situation, the executive’s self is swallowed up by his
organizational role; thus, the executive’s communications with counsel
are deemed to be the corporation’s. The proposed rule retains this
disappearance of executive-communicator personhood, not only at the
time the corporation’s privilege is created, but also through its waiver.
Current law, after a corporate privilege waiver, imparts a personal
element to the executive’s communications. 133 The proposed veto
provides a means to remove it, thereby maintaining the purely corporate
character of the communication.
Further, modifying the effects of a corporate waiver makes it
consistent with the consequences faced when individuals waive their
privileges. When an individual waives the privilege, only his words

129.
130.

Id.
430 F.2d 1093, 1095 (5th Cir. 1970); see GERGACZ, supra note 1, at §§ 6.01.50 (discussing Garner’s influence on corporate privilege law).
131. See Garner, 430 F.2d at 1103-04.
132. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981); see GERGACZ, supra note 1,
at §§ 3.78, 3.79, 3.84, 3.86A, 3.90 (discussing these Upjohn factors).
133. E.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 n. 5 (“Ordinarily,
the privilege belongs to the corporation and an employee cannot himself claim the
attorney-client privilege and prevent disclosure of communications between himself and
the corporation’s counsel if the corporation has waived the privilege.” (citing In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich. 1977))); see generally,
GERGACZ, supra note 1, at §§ 2.04-.09.
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become discoverable because only his words were protected. 134 Under
current law, however, when a corporation waives its privilege, the words
of others become discoverable. 135 Even though those words belong to
the corporation, for privilege purposes, they were communicated by an
employee. Following the waiver, that employee, as well as the
corporation, can face consequences. By limiting the consequences for
the communicating employee, the proposed rule more closely aligns a
corporate waiver’s effects with those of an individual client’s.
B. Encourages Candid Communication with a Corporation’s Attorney
Under current law, executives who candidly communicate with
corporate counsel can face liability arising from those communications,
if the corporation waives its privilege. 136 Although this waiver scenario
is not a common event, high-profile cases, such as In re Grand Jury
Subpoena: Under Seal 137 and United States v. Stein, 138 might ultimately
affect executive candor.
Loyalty to one’s employer, of course, remains an incentive. Such
loyalties are called into question when corporations waive privileges to
suit their own ends, however, irrespective of the effect on their
executives. Self-preservation rather than fidelity to one’s organizational
role might assert itself and affect the extent of future executives’ candor.
Although the risk of adverse job consequences remains a spur, such a
concern will be mitigated by the prospect of one’s own words later being
used as evidence of personal wrongdoing. Executives closely connected
to the subject matter, those who possess top-flight, important
information, will be most affected.
The proposed veto empowers such executives. If an advisory is
provided, the executive knows the implications of communicating with
134. Cf. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391 (noting that privilege is different for individuals
and for corporations because for individuals, “the provider of information and the
person who acts on the lawyer’s advice are one and the same,” but for corporations,
information must come from multiple individuals).
135. E.g., Diversified Indus., Inc., 572 F.2d at 611 n. 5; see also United States v.
Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under
Seal, 415 F.3d 333, 335 (4th Cir. 2005); see generally GERGACZ, supra note 1, at §
2.09.
136. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d at 333; Stein, 463
F. Supp. 2d at 459.
137. 415 F.3d at 333.
138. 463 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
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corporate counsel. For example, concerns about a possible corporate
privilege waiver disclosing what was said may lead the executive to seek
guidance from a personally-retained attorney before communicating.
The key is that the executive knows the personal consequences and that
his employer made sure he did. Trustworthy employers take care of
their employees. On the other hand, in absence of an advisory, the
executive is not jeopardized by misapprehensions regarding the
intricacies of corporate privilege law. Either way, organizational loyalty
is not undermined and candor should be enhanced.
Furthermore, the proposed rule should have a positive effect on
executive-corporate counsel relations. Counsel must retain trust when
dealing with executives.
Corporate privilege waivers that put
communicating executives in jeopardy and risk creating an impression
that cooperating with counsel is beset with perils. By removing such
confidence barriers, the proposed rule fosters a healthy relationship
between corporate counsel and executives.
C. Promotes Fairness Considerations
The logic of corporate privilege law has unanticipated fairness
concerns that arise from its nature—specifically, that the entity controls
the privilege and the communicator does not. This is a distinguishing
characteristic between privilege for corporate and individual clients.
Individual clients are not affected by waiver decisions made by others.
Their communications with counsel must be personally waived, either
expressly or implicitly. No unfairness arises because the individual
client controls the waiver.
This is not so for communicating executives. Their involvement is
limited to providing information and they face the effects of a waiver
without any ability to control it.
The disconnect between
communication and waiver disenfranchises the executive. Under current
law, the executive is treated as merely a means to an end, the creation of
a corporation’s privilege. His worth and legitimate interests as a human
being are ignored. Instead, the executive is subsumed into the logic of
privilege law that places great weight on the identity of the client.
Consequently, when the corporate client waives the privilege, the
executive is cut adrift. This is unfair. Justice requires that the
executive’s interests be acknowledged.
Furthermore, this Article’s veto proposal is consistent with the law
being shaped by justice concerns. Other bodies of law have changed
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logical rule-based outcomes when unanticipated injustices result.
Corporate privilege law should follow suit. Consider partnership by
estoppel, for example. 139 No organizational form is created when third
parties rely on false representations that a partnership exists. Instead,
liability is imposed, as if a partnership exists, to ameliorate the
unfairness arising from the relying party’s otherwise unsatisfied
claims. 140 Without partnership by estoppel, the logic of partnership law
has it that ersatz partners would not face liability. They were not parties
by contract, personally, nor were they operating a business as a
partnership. For justice reasons, the third party’s interests needed to be
accommodated. Similarly, in the law of wills, a named beneficiary will
not inherit, if the beneficiary had murdered his benefactor, even though
the will itself was flawless. 141 Although the logic of wills law and its
focus on proving up a valid document suggests that the murderer will
inherit, the fairness principle interposes itself.
Criminal law also provides an example. Generally, defendants are
competent to testify and their incriminating statements or confessions
may be used as evidence against them. However, the logic of this
proposition is leavened by fairness, specifically, in how those
incriminating statements came about. 142 Thus, in criminal law, to
ameliorate unfairness, courts may exclude certain defendant statements
from evidence.
Conceptually, this evidence exclusion is somewhat similar to this
Article’s proposed rule. Although corporate privilege law does not have
Constitutional underpinnings, the unfairness upon which the evidence
exclusion is based is remarkably similar; a person should not have his
statements used as evidence, if they were induced without a sufficient
advisory or understanding of the personal ramifications of making them.

139. See generally JUDSON CRANE & ALAN BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, 196200 (1968).
140. See, e.g., Boone v. Gen. Shoe Corp., 242 S.W.2d 138, 142-43 (Ark. 1951).
141. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 191 (N.Y. 1889).
142. The Supreme Court has considered a number of fairness challenges to
statements defendants made to the police. See Blackburn v. United States, 361 U.S.
199, 206-07 (1959) (coerced confessions); Escobedo v. Ill., 378 U.S. 478 (1964)
(confession made without honoring defendant’s request for counsel beforehand);
Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 486 (1966) (no advisory provided prior to making
statements to police).

